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The agenda in Turkey is changing very rapidly. There isn’t even a moment to catch one’s breath and assess what is happening. On Tuesday, following the group meeting, the leader of the CHP, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, and the leader of the MHP, Devlet Bahçeli, met. The meeting lasted a total of 15 minutes. It was noted as a ‘friendly chat’. It is common knowledge that the two leaders share a long-standing friendship and acquaintance. They may well have thought, ‘Since we’re here at Parliament anyway, let’s have a quick natter.’ However, with the country in its current state, and given that both figures keep expressing similar views on numerous issues, it is essential to take a closer look at this relationship. But before that, let’s take a look at Bahçeli’s performance over the last 15 days.

WILL ERDOĞAN GIVE BAHÇELİ WHAT HE WANTS?

In his group speech in Parliament on Tuesday, 6 October, Bahçeli explicitly demanded that legislative power be handed to the MHP in the event of Erdoğan’s re-election. Although not discussed at length, let us set aside the issue of ‘executive power’ for now.

In the same speech, Bahçeli also addressed foreign policy, adopting a more assertive stance than his AKP partner regarding the tensions between Yemen and Saudi Arabia. He explicitly stated that military support should be provided if the path to dialogue with the Houthis were to be closed. In other words, he called for the “Mecca Pact” to be put into action.

There is another issue that is at least as important but has still not received sufficient attention, and one that was on Bahçeli’s radar: relations had become strained following the reaction from senior AKP officials and those close to the Presidential Palace to Azerbaijan’s ban on headscarves in schools. Whilst Bahçeli sought to defuse the situation on the one hand, on the other he openly sided with Azerbaijan. In his written statement, after stating that “respect must be shown for every state’s sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and domestic law”, he concluded: “It is of the utmost importance to act on the basis of common sense, mutual understanding and collective wisdom in the face of any approach aimed at undermining the bonds of brotherhood between the two countries.”

To summarise: Bahçeli sought to clarify his stance ahead of the forthcoming elections; he then once again updated his position on Middle Eastern politics in line with the US stance; and he demonstrated that he intends to exert influence both in the regime struggle and in regional politics, primarily through the Turkic world, with Azerbaijan at the forefront.

COULD THERE BE A COALITION BETWEEN THE CHP AND THE MHP?

Whilst Bahçeli is forging this broad coalition to strengthen the state both domestically and internationally, he is obliged to build a ‘non-objecting, domestic and national’ opposition bloc across various arenas. To bring his plan to reality, he needs to strengthen his domestic alliances. Firstly, it is fair to say that the new line of communication he has established with PKK leader Öcalan has made Bahçeli’s task easier. Kurdish politics has begun to regard Bahçeli—whom it has viewed as an ‘enemy’ for 40 years—as one of the most critical political figures, and this line of communication is progressing on the basis of mutual ground.

Another structure Bahçeli relies on is the judiciary and security bureaucracy, which has taken root within the state and has reached a point where it is politically more influential than the AKP. The moves coming from this structure are in complete harmony with the MHP’s domestic political objectives.

Now let us turn to the meeting between Kılıçdaroğlu and Bahçeli mentioned at the start of the article. The timing of the meeting is far more significant than the duration of the meeting itself. This contact could be the first step towards closer cooperation. Both figures favour symbolic gestures. The meeting must be assessed without forgetting that there is a political bond between the two that goes far beyond their old friendship. There is a striking similarity between the Turkey that Kılıçdaroğlu described even before he was officially appointed leader of the CHP and Bahçeli’s moves.

LOCAL AND NATIONAL OPPOSITION

It is possible to summarise the similarities immediately: first and foremost, they are not (for the time being) objecting to Erdoğan’s presidency; they are, in effect, the de facto representatives of the ‘local-national opposition’ role that Erdoğan has consistently emphasised. Just as they have not objected to Trump’s Middle East project, they have no issue with the roles assigned to Turkey. Moreover, the prospect of a more authoritarian state apparatus being run by bureaucrats is, for them, akin to a question in an exam coming from the very section they have studied best.

It appears that in the coming period, we will witness closer synchronisation between the MHP and a weakened CHP within the judiciary, the bureaucracy and Parliament. The question is whether this closeness will translate into an electoral alliance at the ballot box. It is not possible to give a definitive answer; the picture will take shape depending both on the deals the parties strike with the Palace and on the resistance shown by the opposition.

However, this new configuration explains all too well the reckless self-confidence displayed by the regime in the discussions surrounding early elections. As we head towards 2028, the real question is this: will Turkey be condemned to helplessly watch this bureaucratic farce unfold, or will a genuine political will emerge to shatter this engineered cycle and forge its own path? The country’s fate will be determined by the answer to this very question.

Note: This article is translated from the original article titled Bahçeli ve KK'nın ortak Türkiye planı: Arkadaştan fazlası, published in BirGün newspaper on October 16, 2026.